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Jochen Becker
1979 and following
Between Kabul and Tehran
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| The Shah with bowed head crossing the Golf
of Persia, his pockets full of money, leaving the oil industry.
Khomeini takes the free place. |
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| Chewing-gum-paper with greetings
to the warriors of Islam and »Death to the USA« |
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| Wall-painting in front of the former US-Embassy.
Teheran 2002 (Photo: Sandra Schäfer) |
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From the White to the Islamic Revolution
The "White Revolution" propagated by the Shah in 1963
was a land reform against big landowners dictated from above. The
wealth gained through the oil boom and the price-boosting "oil
crisis" of 1973 enabled the regime - as is still the case today
- to temporarily pacify the population. All the same, the Iranian
economy slipped into a recession in the 1970s due to excessive government
spending. The gap between the impoverished population and the extremely
wealthy rapidly widened. (19)
Ayatollah Khomeini, who was already in opposition
at the time, was deported to Turkey. He then lived for several years
in Iraqi exile and from October 1978 on in the Parisian suburb of
Neauphle-le-Château. This offered him access to the worldwide
press and to the BBC, which broadcast programmes in Farsi that reached
a large audience in Iran, something which facilitated the upcoming
revolt from abroad. (20) Bahman Nirumand gives a description of
the pilgrimages to the "Ayatollah under the apple tree",
whom even leftists asked for an audience.
The battle against the Shah was fought both domestically
and in exile. (21) When Shah opponents disrupted his visit with
U.S. president Carter, the tear gas employed against the protesters
blew towards the foreign dignitaries. "The Shah cries and the
people laugh", was the slogan of the demonstrations that same
evening in the streets of Tehran. At the beginning of 1978, tens
of thousands took to the streets in the holy city of Qom. Since
after seven and forty days the dead are remembered, the funeral
processions turned into mass demonstrations. (22) At night people
in Tehran, and later in other cities, stood on the roofs and shouted
"Allah o Akbar - God is almighty". These actions were
supported by strikes in the power plants: "At night the ghosts
appeared - a psychological battle that could not be dealt with by
employing weapons and tanks" (Nirumand 1985: 60). Mosques served
to organize food cooperatives, the medical treatment of victims
of the protests, "night patrols", and the sale of oil;
there were kindergartens, theatre groups and courses on Islam, Marxism,
economy, Arabic grammar, contemporary history, as well as various
other training offers and language classes. "The Western leftists
would say that the supporters of Khomeini organized the workers
on the neighbourhood level and less or not at all in the factories."
(July 1979: 99).
While the secular Left and the bourgeois opposition
were driven to the torture chambers or out of the country, the organizational
power of the clergy and its national network of Koran schools and
mosques increasingly empowered the religious opposition. Hundreds
of thousands of mullahs dispersed throughout the country were activated
and placed at the service of the revolution. Mosques were turned
into party meeting-places. "On their initiative, numerous grassroots
committees were founded who raised the claim to administrate social
life. In face of the disintegration of the state apparatus, in several
cities (...) they were able to establish a substitute and proclaim
an autonomous Islamic republic. There were around three thousand
mosques in Tehran. (...) According to unconfirmed estimates, approximately
100 mosques were deeply committed to the revolution" (July
1979: 98).
More than two million people participated in a protest
march in Tehran in December 1978. The struggles were accompanied
by strikes of oil workers, airline employees, the editorial staffs
of newspapers, banks employees, and public servants. As opposed
to the official image that the current president, Mahmood Ahmadinejad,
again conjures up today, the poor population was not the main pillar
of the revolution. "One could have (...) conceived that, for
example, the slum residents, who had fled to the cities in the hundreds
of thousands as a result of the land reform and now led a life in
poverty on the outskirts of the cities, would have protested against
the regime. Or also the deprived inhabitants of the remote regions"
(Nirumand 1985: 17). The contribution of Asef Bayat in this volume
examines the actions and activities of those marginalized in the
cities, who in the shadow of the revolution went their own ways
instead.
Once the protests and revolts against the Shah took
hold of the military itself in the form of disobedience, desertions
and sabotage, the Shah fled to Egypt on January 16, 1979. Two days
later, Iran experienced the largest demonstration in its history.
The overthrow, which was until then supported by the most various
political and social groups, was now clearly dominated by the mullahs
and interpreted as a plebiscite in favour of Khomeini's reign. Religious
"forces of order" tore pictures of Mosaddeq from the hand
of protesters and attacked them with knives and chains. Paint was
spilt on women with open hair; later acid was used to cauterize
their faces. Cinemas were burnt down, film rolls were thrown on
the street, alcohol was removed from shops, bars, hotels, and soon
also from private homes; entire breweries were burnt down and bottles
were publicly smashed.
In January 1979 the government heads of France,
Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Unites States
met to discuss the aggravated situation in Iran. The United States
set up a special crisis committee. During this time, the Iranian
press experienced a short phase of freedom between the flight of
the Shah and the appointment of the new leader. Soon afterwards,
Khomeini's people occupied the coordinating positions in radio and
TV. "We shall eradicate Westernization. (...) All must adapt
to Islam", Khomeini declared from Qom three weeks after his
arrival in Iran, and proclaimed the Islamic Republic. In the beginning,
the new line was not without contradiction. For example, on the
occasion of the 30th anniversary of Masaddeq's death on March 5,
1979, a million people too to the streets, organized by the National
Democratic Front. On the next day, leftist book stores and publishing
houses, newspapers and kiosks were attacked and burnt down. "Communist
pig" became a popular slur. In Shiraz, the revolutionary court
began passing sentences on so-called enemies of the revolution;
numerous homosexuals and prostitutes were sentenced to death. Women's
Day onMarch 8 was placed under the Hezbollah verdict, "either
the headscarf or a blow to the head". (23) Democracy was deemed
a Western concept. 98.2 percent of the population allegedly voted
for the introduction of an Islamic republic. All essential ideas
of the Ayatollah were included in the constitution passed at the
end of 1979. The question of power was decided with the introduction
of the Islamic revolution and the passing of the constitution.
Official Islamicization
The Left was only able to benefit for a short time from the mutual
instrumetalization - the Left making use of the clergy and Khomeini's
charisma, the Islamists utilizing the anchorage of the liberal forces
in the bourgeois spectrum. Along with the regional and religious
minorities the Left soon became the victim of attacks. The revolution
was accompanied by a wave of executions of the old elites and new
opponents. The Islamists established a power structure parallel
to the police and armed forces. The power of the "Revolutionary
Corps" (Basiij) (24) and the "Revolutionary Guards"
(Pasdars) is unbroken until today. The industry and property of
the Shah family was transferred to endowments that now still form
the basis of the uncontrolled wealth of the ruling Islamistic class.
"These Pasdars act in concealment. (...) They operate their
own seaports and airports, evading the state. (...) They additionally
oust their competitors in all profitable sectors with their political,
military and economic influence", is how Rainer Hermann described
Iran's new elites who control two thirds of the production, while
not paying taxes and acting "beyond the scope of the visible
state" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 10, 2006).
Bahman Nirumand states that the official Islamicization
of the country in the wake of the drastic changes of 1979 began
with the women. At the end of February 1979 the "Law to Protect
the Family" was abolished and, with it, birth control as well.
Wearing the headscarf, which was banned under the Shah, was now
mandatory. The demonstration on International Women's Day on March
8, directed against the compulsion to wear the hejab, was massively
attacked. Prostitution was forbidden (25) and the red-light district
of Shahr-e Now in the south of Tehran - where Kamran Shirdel's film
"Qal'eh" was set - was raided by hundreds of paramilitary
Hezbollah with torches. The women were taken away and the houses
burnt down. Six thousand prostitutes had previously worked in the
narrow, winding streets and alleys.
On November 4, 1979, students in Tehran occupied
the U.S. embassy and took the diplomats hostage. The United States
imposed an economic boycott which is maintained until today. Iran,
in turn, used this conflict for a further domestic forcing into
line. The failed attempt to free the hostages cost President Jimmy
Carter his re-election in 1980. Precisely at the time when victorious
Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, the hostages were let free after
444 days. In June 1980 the Shah died of cancer in Cairo.
In autumn of 1980 Iraq attacked Iran. (26) The fear
of a Shiite Islamicization of the region and the influence of the
United States on Saddam Hussein were presented as reasons. The enormous
stocks of weapons (27) of the Shah regime saved Iran, which was
weakened by the revolution, from being overrun. But the expected
blitzkrieg turned into an eight-year-long war of attrition that
prolonged the revolution's state of emergency and covered up the
growing social and political problems in Iran. House searches and
road-blocks became part of everyday life, critics of the regime
were arrested, tortured and executed. The war changed the face of
the newly founded republic and cost hundreds of thousands of lives
inside the country and on the front. "Martyrs" with the
"key to paradise" around their necks blew themselves up
as human mine-detectors. Even Tehran was bombed by specially equipped
Iraqi aircraft and missiles, and for this reason the wealthier inhabitants
moved to the east behind the mountain ranges. Darkness descended
over the city at night due to the black-outs.
In a hopeless situation Iran finally agreed to a
ceasefire in July 1988. The country was exhausted. At the same time,
thousands of political prisoners were executed and a fatwa was issued
against Salman Rushdie with a bounty of several million euros. In
June 1989 the revolutionary leader Khomeini died. His successor,
Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, assumed office with the promise of supporting
the industry to a greater extent. But his liberal economic programme
did not suit the conservative bazaar purveyors who dominated Iran's
entire trade. When Rafsanjani's technocratic programme failed, leaving
behind increased external debt, there were repeated food revolts
by "peopled deprived of their rights" starting in mid-1991,
which were brutally suppressed by the military.
In 1997 the liberal Islamist and former Minister
of Cultural Affairs, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, won the presidential
elections. Civil society, freedom of the press, equality of women,
and the de-ideologizing or denationalization of religion became
part of the vocabulary of Iranian politics. These political promises
met a positive response, especially with younger people and the
urban intellectual milieus. For a short while, the press landscape
flourished, and in the wake of the alliance against the Afghan Taliban
regime, an easing of the tension with the United States even appeared
possible. But everyday life was different. The invitation of Iranians
more or less critical of the regime to a conference organized by
the Heinrich-Böll Foundation in Berlin led to the imprisonment
of many attendants after their return from Germany. (28) The judiciary
tormented even moderate dissidents and did not shrink from death
sentences and execution squads.
The Iranian parliament, which compared with other
countries of the Near and Middle East was lively and open to discussion,
was ultimately dismissed by the conservative Council of Guardians:
"Each and every republican institution has a superordinate
clerical one" (Nirumand 1985: 119). Ninety percent of the draft
statutes presented by the "reform government" at the time
were blocked or rejected by the Council of Guardians, a sort of
constitutional court. Control was so tight that even the president's
television speeches had to be approved by the conservative censors.
This impotence vis-à-vis the Council of Guardians and the
unkept promises of his government forced Khatami to step down at
the end of his term in 2004 as a failed reformer.
Despite the religious permeation of politics, "in
the year 25 after the Islamic revolution the Iranian population
is perhaps the most secularised in the Middle East" (Amipur/Witzke
2004: 9). Ahmadinejad's election as the new president is not necessarily
a sign of a distinct religiousness of the Iranians but a protest
against poverty. Forty percent of the population, according to the
Iranian Chamber of Commerce, live below the poverty line, and fifty
percent are unemployed. At the same time, competition on the education
market is extreme. In the year 2000, 1.5 million school-leavers
applied for 130,000 university places. (29) Ahmadinejad presents
himself as a down-to-earth guy from the countryside, who knew how
to convert his demonstrative asceticism into electoral success.
It remains to be seen whether he will improve the living conditions
of the poor.
Stories from the Production
When the revolution started in 1978, Iran was in an early phase
of industrialization and simultaneously dependent on food imports,
due to a failed agricultural policy. In Iran, money is primarily
earned through trade, which today is still predominantly controlled
by the traditional bazaar purveyors. In Die Industrialisierung als
Programm der Despotie (Industrialization as the Programme of Despotism),
Eberhard Jungfer describes the living conditions of the estimated
four million members of the urban underclass in the 1970s. They
had to eke out their existence "under the unbelievably miserable
conditions of subsistence trade in the suburbs, as day-labourers
in the bazaar shops, working up to 18 hours a day, [or] as contract
workers". While some were "flogged by middlemen to industrial
enterprises for a short period", women and children lived "off
of homework or labour in the dark basements of carpet-makers"
(Jungfer 1979: 77).
Prior to the revolution, in Tehran alone 700,000
people were involved in "dead work", as a minister called
the sale of chewing gum in the streets (Bürker 1979: 8). (30)
Hundreds of thousands of job-seekers emigrated to the neighbouring
sheikhdoms. At the same time, around 50,000 immigrated Afghan and
Pakistani assembly workers laboured for low wages in Iran and "were
utilized to enforce industrial discipline via the ethnic division
of the workforce and (...) additionally functioned as strikebreakers"
(ebd.: 86). In the assembly plants of "Iran National",
where Mercedes lorries and busses (31) as well as Chrysler cars
and tractors were manufactured, workers from Afghanistan constituted
a large portion of the staff. Further guest workers for the building
industry came from Turkey and the Philippines - while the jobless
rate in the country continued to rise. "Mass production in
the foreign state companies could only be raised to a standard that
at least partly corresponded with the Western norms through the
massive exploitation of women and the employment of foreign labourers"
(ibid.: 88).
Flight of capital, the emigration of qualified workers
and the exodus of the former elites have left clear marks on Iran's
post-revolutionary society. There is hardly a global enterprise
willing to set up its headquarters in Tehran. "After walking
through the city for a couple of days it becomes clear that the
huge posters of martyrs who died in the war between Iraq and Iran
only serve to cover up the remains of ostentatious company headquarters
that were never completed", is how the Dutch architect Wouter
Vanstiphout describes his impressions (2005: 76).
"Islamism as it exists in reality" (Amipur/Witzke
2004) is how others mockingly call this development, alluding to
the collapse of the real-socialist GDR. At the same time, Iran possesses
the third largest oil deposits in the world, and ranks second behind
Russia in gas reserves, which decisively contributes to the country's
income. Rich oil reserves and political influence reaching far into
neighbouring regions make Tehran appear as a "semi-peripheral
global city" (ebd.: 25) that competes with other metropolises
in Turkey and Pakistan as well as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States
and the Middle East.
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