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Stephan Lanz
How the Favela Triumphed
A short political story of the favelas
in Rio de Janeiro




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"Urbanization yes, expulsion never!"
The battle for the favela
The 1960s saw the fiercest battles over the favela. In 1960,
the journalist Carlos Lacerda won the elections for governor of
the new federal state of Rio de Janeiro. Years earlier he had put
out a sensational series of articles titled "The Battle of
Rio de Janeiro" in which he demanded a political solution for
the favela, described as "trampoline of death".
Newly in office, Lacerda assigned to the sociologist José
Arthur Rios, who was familiar with the morros from a two-year
study, the task of coordinating the government's social services.
Rios "first eliminated all contacts between the favelados
and the political 'benefactors'", because he understood the
cabo eleitoral as the "despot within the community" (Rios
2002: 68). At the same time, he transformed the "Service for
the Recuperation of Favelas and Anti-hygienic Dwellings" (SERFHA),
which had until then had only threatened with expulsions, into an
institute for the foundation of residents associations. Until today,
Rios underlines his ideal of democratization (ibid.), but he politically
subjugated the associations to the state: They had to contractually
undertake to subject themselves to the official coordination of
education and urbanization programmes, to prevent new buildings,
if required using the force of the police, and to maintain law and
order. The state, in turn, committed itself to the stepwise improvement
of housing conditions and the support of the associations. In the
end, according to Baumann Burgos (1998: 32), these agreements were
a barter, trading the promise of urbanization for the political
control of the residents associations.
José Arthur Rios also introduced "help
for self-help" as an instrument of the favela policy
and thus stands for a further path-breaking novelty: "Operação
Mutirão" was the name he used to designate a collective
construction programme of community centres, medical stations and
schools that alluded to the rural term for neighbourly help. The
state government usually provided material left over from the demolition
of buildings as well as engineers, while the favelados contributed
their labour (Rios 2002: 69). "Operação Mutirão"
for the first time counted on the participation of the inhabitants
and deemed social and economic measures necessary for improving
the living conditions of the favelados. Rios also stressed
the qualities of the favela in terms of urban development.
He compared their structure with medieval cities and merely wanted
to enhance its standard.
This policy, which despite its paternalistic features
aimed at emancipation, came under pressure from clientelistic politicians
worrying about their prospects at elections and from the real-estate
industry that wanted to vacate the favelas in the now valuable
southern zone. After just one and a half years, Rios had to give
way to the conservative Sandra Calvalcanti (3). Lacerda now established
the repressive "Programa de Remoção" (Removal
Programme) to eliminate the phenomenon of the favela. Their
large-scale demolition began. Inhabitants were resettled to specially
erected state-subsidized flats (conjuntos habitacionais). A national
housing bank (BNH) funded the expulsions and the new settlement.
In these years, the Vila Kennedy, co-financed by money from the
United States, was established as well as the Cidade de Deus, which
today has ironically become the symbol of violence in the favelas.
The residents associations, on the other hand, politicized themselves
against their abuse as cabos eleitorais which immediately
began again after Rios' departure and in 1963 founded the umbrella
organization FAFEG to organize resistance against repression. The
first FAFEG congress in 1964 in a confrontational manner demanded
the favelas' right to public infrastructures.
The military coup of the same year brought an end
to this polarized situation, stepped up the policy of expulsion
and broke resistance with force. For the military, the ideologically
contested housing policy, which had secured the left a dominant
position in the favelas, was of strategic importance to legitimize
their regime. Shortly after the putsch, soldiers occupied Morro
do Pasmado, which was defended by the FAFEG, and in the end
burnt it down. Arson also destroyed Praia do Pinto with 7,000 inhabitants
in the southern zone, after the inhabitants had offered massive
resistance against their resettlement. In the following years numerous
leaders of the association were arrested and some were murdered;
after their second congress in 1968 the entire committee of the
FAFEG was interned and replaced by "vassals loyal to the state"
(Dietz 2000: 168). A new constitutional act, "No. 5",
denied "subversive elements" their civil rights and exposed
the remaining activists to the permanent threat of arrest. The authorities
now controlled all activities of the residents associations: In
Catacumbiwhich was later vacated, for example, the residents association
was transformed into a committee of guards, according to Perlman,
that allowed no construction whatsoever and strictly controlled
access to the settlement (1977: 59). Many associations preferred
to dissolve during this phase. Up until 1974, 80 favelas
were vacated, and around 140,000 inhabitants were resettled to 35
residential complexes for the most part located far away from the
city centre (Happe 2002: 93). At the same time, the BNH tried to
pacify the favelados by offering them the acquisition of
subsidized homes of their own in the new settlements and thus making
them conform to the social norms stipulated by the military.
A secret, individual form of resistance led to the
failure of this policy: Despite intensive expulsions, the number
of favela inhabitants rose by a third between 1970 and 1973 alone.
Families often moved to a favela when its eviction was announced
to get hold of a new sate-subsidized flat. Later they illegally
sold them for an extra charge to persons with higher income who
were not entitled to these flats and moved back to the favela. As
a sign of protest, the FAFEG called for collectively denying the
payment of rent, electricity or water (Happe 2002: 200). Indeed,
new owners in the residential complexes frequently did not pay their
instalments. Unpaid rent led to eviction, but by then the occupants
had saved months of rent they would otherwise have had to pay in
the favela. Without being organized, around three quarters
of those affected had fallen into arrears with their payments in
1970 (Pfeiffer 1987: 135). In the mid-1070s, the BNH finally stopped
the construction of housing for low-income earners. The regime's
policy had utterly failed.
However, the state by no means acted as a hermetic
apparatus during the military dictatorship. As early as 1968, when
the strongest phase of repression began, Governor Negrão
de Lima, newly elected following a favela-friendly campaign, founded
the CODESCO - Company for Community Development (4) which was meant
to develop participatory urbanization programmes. Although it failed
to a large extent due to the opposition of the regime, a symbolic
victory over the repression was achieved with the model urbanization
of Brás de Pina which was earmarked for expulsion. In this
context, a central role was played by the young team of architects
around Carlos N. F. dos Santos called "Quadra", which
had close ties to the social movements and worked for the FAFEG
(Pereira da Silva 2002). "Quadra" was influenced by the
architect John Turner, who considered self-organized "housing
by people" as a contribution to solving the problem of housing,
and together with inhabitants upgraded the standard of Lima. The
assertion, "They showed me solutions that are problems and
problems that are solutions", which he made when visiting state
residential complexes and favelas in Rio, became the motto
of the fight against the politics of destruction (Pereira da Silva
2002: 109). Based on Turner's principles, Brás de Pina, which
was widely politicized on account of the expulsion attempts, experienced
the first participatory approach to urbanization in Rio. Architects
and residents associations developed a joint master plan which they
implemented with the assistance of the CODESCO. The residents themselves
drew up the plans for rebuilding their houses.
But a leading article in the leftish newspaper jornal
do brasil gets more to the essence of the social mood at the time:
"From the occupation of plots of land [...] up to the secret
tapping of power lines, the favelado becomes a parasite of
the state [...] Eking out a bare existence in promiscuity, these
groups of the population establish a world without rights, but also
without duties. The utopian wish to urbanize the favelas
is opposed by the most elementary principles of administrative logic.
The ideal is not to stimulate the favela, but to eliminate
it". (05/18/1969, cited in Baumann 2001: 102)
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